Universal resolver · DID Resolution v1 · W3C Candidate Recommendation Draft · Evidence, not scores
Identity, resolved.
Resolve supported decentralized identifiers, credentials, MCP servers, and A2A agents into verifiable evidence — what is proven, what is not, and exactly how DID.is knows.
Awaiting inputDID, DID URL, credential, JWT, MCP endpoint, A2A agent or origin
§ Method
Four levels of disclosure
- Level 1Verdict
One sentence per dimension of evidence, in plain language — including the ones that are not established.
- Level 2Evidence graph
Every document, key, origin, certificate and linkage credential as a node; every relation as a verified, observed or merely declared edge.
- Level 3Telemetry
The resolution as it happened: DNS pinning, TLS handshake, parsing, hash-chain and signature checks, with real timings.
- Level 4Substrate
Raw JSON-LD, multicodec varint breakdowns, RFC 7638 thumbprints and the exact API calls to reproduce every result.
§ Establishes
What can be proven
- Cryptographic control
- Which keys a DID authorises, validated as curve points, per verification relationship.
- Origin binding
- A DIF Well-Known DID Configuration credential signed by the DID for the exact origin.
- Transport
- The TLS certificate actually presented, validated by rustls against the Mozilla root store.
- Verifiable history
- did:webvh hash chains, SCIDs, update-key signatures, pre-rotation and witness thresholds.
- Credential integrity
- Data Integrity and JOSE proofs, validity windows, fail-closed Bitstring Status List checks.
§ Refuses
What DID.is will never claim
- Trust scores
- No number can summarise evidence that is partly unknown. DID.is reports states, not grades.
- Legal identity
- A verified domain or key says nothing about the organisation behind it.
- Issuer authority
- A valid signature proves who signed — not that they were entitled to make the claim.
- Agent behaviour
- Delegation chains prove what was granted, never that an agent stays within it.
- DID Resolution v1 (CR Draft)W3C 1 Oct 2026 · HTTPS binding
- did:webvh 1.0SCID, entry hashes, pre-rotation, witnesses
- Data Integrity EdDSA / ECDSAeddsa-jcs-2022 · ecdsa-jcs-2019
- VC Data Model 2.0+ VC-JWT 1.1, vc+jwt
- Bitstring Status Listverified lists, fail-closed
- DIF DID ConfigurationJWT + Data Integrity linkage
- MCP 2026-07-28stateless discover; legacy fallback
- A2A 1.0agent cards, JWS signatures
- RDF canonicalization suitesreported as unsupported